“thebeautifulonesarehere” (with thanks to Lebo Ntladi)

1. Openings

A stare—let us not call it a gaze—is solicited. Staring is persistent attention, bafflement, return. Again and again, “what is this?” and “how is it calling to me?” and “why is it calling to me?”

The siren song of visual objects.

I encountered Lebo Ntladi’s “thebeautifulonesarehere,” one of four in a series, at the Critically Queer exhibition curated by Jabu Pereira at the University of Cape Town. “Encounter” does not quite capture the multiple times I returned to look at the photograph, captured, first, by the recognizability of a human form, face-to-chest, and then by its dispersal into space, its accumulation of known and unknown cityscapes and landscapes, its vibrant colors and geometries, its making and unmaking of gendered (and other) possibilities.

Captured, I begged Lebo to send me photos of the work so I could try “thinking with it.” Lebo graciously agreed, sending me digital files of the entire series and ways of framing the entire project.

This particular encounter, these textual fragments, might be considered attempts at joining an ongoing conversation.

2. Framing

My name is Kelebogile Ntladi, I am a social documentary and portrait photographer based in Johannesburg, South Africa. Thebeautifulonesarehere are photographic portraits, an ongoing body of work about identity. As someone who is a masculine presenting female, I often feel uncomfortable in public spaces, more than often lately in clubs, social events, parties, where there is a large black male presence. A constant discomfort every time someone male feels the need to establish their presence, in whichever way, as the Alpha male. It could be through a handshake, a shove, disapproving comments or more violent actions. I had often assumed that people in my own age group, mid twenties, and younger are generations more open, knowledgeable and understand different gender identities.

These collages are made from photos I took of various spaces in Johannesburg, the city and surrounding areas. Barbershops, inner-city schools, fences, abandoned buildings, the morgue, caskets, portraits of fashion, queers, and self portraits. I worked in layers. I drew portraits on paper of humans with animal-like features, horns, ears and trunks. I then added objects relating to science fiction or technology, sunglass like, futuristic frames. In each image I tried to make reference to urban cultural norms, body piercing, robotics, jewellery or “swag’. The second layer involved cutting the photographs and creating the collage, I like to work with images or spaces that I can control, structure and deconstruct. I chose a colour closer to gold referencing the history of Africa, The looting of wealth and identity and the reclaiming of that wealth and identity in the future.

One of the themes around this work is Afro-futurism, described as a literary and cultural aesthetic that combines science fiction, fantasy and afro centricity and can be identified as artistic, scientific and spiritual. Created to debate and interrogate the struggles of people of the African Diaspora by envisioning a utopia in the future where people of colour will have advanced technologically, socially, culturally and beyond current dystopian realities.

3. Frames
Lebo provides expansive frames: the public making, unmaking, and policing of gender; the (queer) optimism invested in generational change and youth cultures; the personing of geography and the geography of personing, and, here, it might not be out of turn to add (im)personation and (un)personing; the person-producing and person-disrupting possibilities of collage; and the liberationist possibilities of Afro-futurism.

Given Lebo’s frames—the beautiful and indispensable theorizing of “thebeautifulonesarehere”—my fragments, still trying to emerge, might be read as (mostly unnecessary) footnotes, attempts to catch up with the intelligence of the work and the artist.

4. Face-ing
I search my research files frantically, looking for thinking on “the face,” the “African face,” “face-ing,” and, possibly, “face-me(a)nt.” Sexology has taught me how to think about “the African body,” the genital-as-person metonym. Metonymy is spatial displacement, but to use synecdoche, ostensibly a more accurate term, demands that I accept an impossible relationship between racist representations and the people represented, that I accept the fiction and faction of human-unmaking representations.

I cannot do this.

One notes that African faces appear in colonial archives as relations of proximity to (idealized) European faces. These relations of proximity will be called “tribe.” Or, faces appear as the absence of light—as “darkness,” “blackness,” “night,” “unfathomable.” Or, faces appear as affect-bearers, as “horror,” “blankness,” “terror,” “rage,” an excess of emotion—but they cannot blush. The face as “mask-like,” the face as “masking,” the face as “mask.” The face as “shrunken head,” as “trophy,” as evidence of primal violence and ancestor veneration. The face is always appearing as a series of effects on the watcher—“I was scared”; “I was disturbed”; “I was restless”; “I was excited”; “I was aroused”; “I was disgusted.” It is a face of spectacular effects, wild and brutal and inhuman and unhuman. And a face that, years ago when I was thinking with images, did not exist to be read, a face that unappeared in liberatory and progressive attempts to discuss the harm enacted on black bodies. With a caveat that the face cannot be read in isolation—one must look at the slope of the neck, the angle of the torso, the torques that show and hide.

Elsewhere in the exhibition, the family of a murdered lesbian, Andritha Thapelo Morifi, gazed out of their sorrow. The poses were familiar—I have seen them in many Kenyan portraits: arms folded in front of the body, body arranged in school-trained angles, face aware of, but not sure how to interact with, the camera. The formal postures of grief.

I spent many years looking at photographs from my grandfather’s funeral in 1983. Perhaps I was trying to erase the experience of seeing his cotton-stuffed nostrils through the little glass pane in the coffin. Perhaps I wanted to recapture the red-eyed vulnerability on grown-up faces that seemed to disappear after the funeral. Those images taught me about the choreography of grief, about the postures of mourning, postures I recognized in the Critically Queer exhibition.

Behind these postures, histories of (dis)engaging from intrusive gazes.

5. Unlearning
Lebo’s images pose other questions, removing me—removing us—from the face-posture normativities that we know so well, and know not at all. The fluencies I have cultivated begin to unravel: I search for different words, different frames, different possibilities.

Katherine McKittrick teaches me that to say gender is spatial—or geographic—is to say that gender is always produced within and around space, even as gender produces the space around it. Space engenders and gender spatializes.

Kelebogile Ntladi, "thebeautifulonesarehere"

Two mirror images “face” this image, green reflecting into green, and, if one looks closely, a human-like figure turned toward or facing distant houses that, despite their distance, loom large in this green imagination. A tent-like shape (a shelter?) “centers” the face, an off-center “nose” that anchors and disrupts the ostensible symmetry of the mirrored images. A split nose. A history of harm. But also all the possibilities of green—as stolen, as fertile, as fading, as reclaimed. The “off-center” histories that make green so contested.

Atop the face, a helmet—curved like a bull’s horns, shaped like a gladiator’s implement, at once past and future, traditional and futuristic. High school history returns to whisper about Shaka Zulu’s “bull horn” formation—the word “assegai” lingers. My masculinist fantasies—filled with Klingon warriors—reach for two male-looking figures. On the right horn, a figure who appears to be running away from this helmet masculinity, trying to emerge and depart, balanced, on the right shoulder, by a half-face that looks out from an “engulfing darkness.”

I’m trying to “face” this figure, trying to unlearn my need to “face” it, which is to say, to gender its facing.

Symmetry returns, again, in the ear-like or hair-like protrusions that (un)balance the horns. Extending from the green in the face, the extensions look leaf-like, fall leaves, leaves in transition. As with the “face,” where green space gives way to human-made structures, the ear-like:hair-like structures inhabit flux—the asymmetrical vertical and diagonal lines, as with the mirror-image face, refuses the organization of symmetry, the taxonomic boast that to see a half is to see the whole.

A necklace-laced opening flirts with the unmaking labor of necklacing.

I’m still looking for a language to describe this photograph’s doing and undoing, its fantasies and its desires, its histories and presents. The rich, desert-like background it inhabits and emerges from.

This was not the image hanging in the gallery.

6. Re-framing
Before I learn to unlearn, I ask Lebo if the photographs engage with, or respond to, Armah’s The Beautyful Ones are Not Yet Born.

A quick no.

7. Re-turns
Arrested, I linger. Become overwhelmed. Turn away—glance back. Stare again.

Kelebogile Ntladi, Thebeautifulonesarehere, photographic collage, 2014 (4)
Perhaps it is the text, “choice”; “CLASSIC HAIR CUTTING.” The promise of feminist freedom jostles against neoliberal agency—eroding subjects mutter, “I chose this.” A memory intrudes—the smell of barber shops, line drawings of hairstyles that my father taught me to ignore, desperate attempts to recapture River Road barbers in downtown Pittsburgh.

A nipple—is it a nipple?—peeks.

A “face” takes shape as an un-face, as the obscene inside of skin. The word “flay” rushes up from my archives.

Layers make “fore” and “back” difficult to assign. “Face” folds into “face”—a forehead-covering eye mask (or is it?); nose-like features build on each other, white-edged repetitions.

(I’m still trying to “face” this image)

My efforts to “face” this image, my failures to “face” it, make me think of Simone Browne’s work on face-discerning technologies, and their failures. The face-making labor of surveillance technologies: the unfacing labor of surveillance technologies. Which faces register and which ones “error.” The alien-ness of the “non-face.”

The symmetrical, collarbone-adjacent flashes of skin tug at my frames, muttering that this figure is too humanoid not to have human-like features. My failures to “face” this figure, then, resonate as ethical failures to “face” the other.

Lebo’s techno-face reminds us that gender-fuck and gender-play unsettle the “face-ing” of gender legibility.

(a sliver from a tv show: “is this a man or a woman?” screamed to a rapacious crowd)

Among many other things, gender-legibility circulates as a persistent demand, the place where “the human” is personed, or (im)personates.

8. Critical Aids

How does being beyond recognition open or close the field of political possibility?
—Kylie Thomas, Queer African Reader

To reveal the ways in which I am affected by a photograph is to be exposed, describing what I see is an act that ‘outs’ me, one that positions my intimate self in a public sphere. ‘Giving myself up’ before a photograph is also to occupy a subject position beyond or outside of my own.
–Kylie Thomas, Queer African Reader

This thing that I am has no name. At least not in the language of my people; the language of the people of my grandmother; those of my mother and those with whom I share similar identity documents. Pardon me if to claim a people is to implicate myself in an imaginary collective that can never be mine. Forgive what appears as a dis-connect from obvious modes of intelligibility. Pardon me if to use the pronoun “my” is to situate myself in a position of possession; a possession that appears as an exaggeration. But this is necessary.
–Neo Musangi, “In Time and Space”

A map, then, is only a life of conversations about a forgotten list of irretrievable selves.
–Dionne Brand, A Map to the Door of No Return

Africa has to mean a present and a future home again for those who strive for a freedom linked to the freedom of others like and unlike us.
–Pumla Gqola, “The Time Again for an Africanist Imagination”

Seeing an image means not dying.
–Marie-José Mondzain, “What does Seeing an Image Mean?”

9. Futures
This will be a full nine. To reach ten suggests a closure that must be inconceivable when futures must be imagined. And so ten, the roundness, the completion, must be deferred. Forgive the ethnographic lapse.

Collage can be experienced as violent assembly. Reading Kylie Thomas’s writing on how violence is memorialized in Zanele Muholi’s photographs returns me to the white edges in the second image, the traces of tearing; makes me see the barbed-wire fence that makes the blue sky background seem impossible; suggests cutting and jostling, struggles for space, struggles in space.

Struggle is an optimistic word.

If struggle names present conditions of un-freedom, it also points toward futures saturated by freedom. The futures Lebo’s work anticipates—beyond the violence of gendering and the violence against non-normative manifestations of gender—remain marked by struggle, marked by tears and scratches and scars. Marked by familiar cityscapes and landscapes, histories and presents of prohibition and access. This image, these images, enter the future bearing their histories.


*the images here appear courtesy of Lebo Ntladi, with Lebo’s permission. I asked.

Intimate Uganda (with thanks to Dr. Stella Nyanzi)

Uganda has been part of my dreamscapes for as long as I can remember. Before school geography mapped Uganda, I knew it as the place that produced my father, the place inscribed in the Makerere-flavored textbooks in the living room, the place where intellectuals were made, where thinking was possible. It was a place that transformed simple Kenyan herdsboys—no matter how elite their high school education—into doctors and professors and writers, healers and thinkers and dreamers. The place from which a young man whose (older) face I now bear wrote letters to a young woman, imagining the (truncated) future they would build. Uganda, in one particular imagining, was an intimacy-making space, a life-producing space, a world-building space.

My father never spoke of his time at Makerere—my retrospective fantasies unsee the racist textbooks that described “Bantu anatomy” and “the African mind,” enabling other fantasies that build on the usable to imagine the possible.

In a way I can barely apprehend, Uganda lies at the center of my possible.
Uganda has been much in the gay press, mostly press from Europe and the U.S., and also, more generally, on international email groups and in many outraged tweets from around the globe. At a historical moment when gay marriage is becoming increasingly possible across the U.S.—a phenomenon those of us outside the U.S. are urged to interpret as globally progressive, the direction that “history” and “development” should head—Uganda has become the obstinate little cousin, the tantrum-throwing space that insists homosexuality is un-African or, more prosaically, anti-national. Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 (AHA 2014), recently signed into law by president Yoweri Museveni, is a historical burr in the world-liberal project. At least, this is the story in the liberal gay press.

On a recent panel, Dr. Stella Nyanzi—who insists I call her Stella, but this is Africa, and professional titles matter, so I insist on that Dr.—announced that she would not discuss AHA 2014, in part because it was expected of her during a queer conference, especially on a panel dedicated to legal matters. The overwhelming international focus on AHA 2014, she explained, imagined Uganda as a one-act space, refusing to see the constellation of laws emerging from, and re-imagining, Uganda. What, she asked, would happen if those focusing on intimate Uganda paid attention to the Anti-Pornography Act, the Public Order Management Act, and the pending Patriotism Bill? To these, we might add the Marriage and Divorce Bill and the HIV and AIDS Prevention and Control Bill.

Dr. Nyanzi’s colleague, Sandra Ntebi, reminded us about queer legislative victories in Uganda, in Mukasa and Another v Attorney General (2008) and Kasha Jacqueline et al. v Rolling Stone and Giles Muhame (2010). One notes, in fact, that the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, the Marriage and the Divorce Bill, and the HIV and AIDS Prevention and Control Bill were introduced into parliament after (or around when) Victor Mukasa secured a legal victory against the state. One notes, also, that these legal victories, not to mention the vibrant Ugandan queer organizing and coalition building, have been absent in international coverage intent on robbing Ugandans of the capacity to organize or strategize—not to mention U.S.-centered coverage of Uganda interested primarily in what U.S. preachers do when they travel.
Feminist historians of Africa have discussed the changing meanings of public space and public intimacy during colonial modernity. I continue to learn from Luise White about the roles sex workers played in imagining and creating Nairobi’s urban space. Scholars from other spaces have noted that women in rapidly urbanizing Africa were considered morally impure. Having removed themselves from ethno-national enclaves and participating in the various promiscuities that mark urban exchange—conversations with strangers, sharing public transport with strangers, trading with strangers—these women imagined and created socialities that threatened ethno-national imaginations and formations.

Colonial archives depict threatened male ethno-national leaders who wanted to impede women’s mobility and dictate their clothing options—what to wear and when. Simultaneously, colonial leaders and missionaries similarly wanted to direct women’s lives. Combing through the archives, one finds patriarchal collusion between ethno-national leaders and colonial administrators, both of whom focused on controlling how and when women occupied and traveled through space.

If queer studies has taught me to think about intimate publics—I think especially of Samuel Delany’s Time Square Red, Time Square Blue, Pat Califia’s Public Sex, Gayatri Gopinath’s Impossible Diasporas, and Nayan Shah’s Stranger Intimacy—engaging with Africanist archives—fiction by Cyprian Ekwensi and Veronique Tadjo, poetry by Ngwatilo Mawiyoo and Micere Mugo, history by Kenda Mutongi and Nakanyike Musisi—has taught me to think about public intimacies. Combined, queer studies and Africanist archives, have taught me to think about how publics are produced and sustained, how space is not simply inhabited but actively generated and modified by the bodies allowed and forbidden to circulate in that space, how space is gendered and monitored, occupied and emptied, made possible and impossible.
From Dr. Nyanzi, I also learn the use of circuitous paths, of non-linear approaches, about how knowledge-making layers and cuts.
Speculating on the-then Anti-Homosexuality Bill in 2011, I argued,

it aims to re-organize and discipline the public and private life of intimacy. Arguably, this Bill refuses the distinction between public and private life by turning all intimate acts and spaces into objects of surveillance

This understanding can be extended to the Public Order Management Act, which attempts to define—and restrict—the meanings of “public meetings” and political discourse. In broad strokes, the Act restricts public meetings—an assembly of three or more people in a “public space” “at which the principles, policy, actions or failure of any government, political party or political organisation, whether or not that party or organisation is registered under any law, are discussed.” A “public meeting” may also be one

held to form pressure groups to submit petitions to any person or to mobilise or demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or institution, including any government administration or government institution.

Such meetings, if held in “public spaces,” require permission from the Inspector General of Police. I leave others to parse the specifics of this law and the varying and shifting meanings of “public.” Rather crudely, though, this Act attempts to manage the possibility of political publics, of publics becoming political. To use a different language, it attempts to monitor (and manage) the public-making labor of consciousness raising.

If the Public Order Management Act attempts to control the meanings of “public” and “political,” the Anti-Pornography Act attempts to police public and private expression, mobility, and desire. Known casually as the “miniskirt law,” the Act attempts to regulate what appears and circulates in public and private.

Definitions matter here. As written in the Bill (and subsequently modified in the Act),

“pornography” means any cultural practice, radio or television programme, writing, publication, advertisement, broadcast upload on internet, display, entertainment, music, dance, picture, audio or video recording, show, exhibition or any combination of the preceding that depicts—

    (a) a person engaged in explicit sexual activities or conduct;
    (b) sexual parts of a person including breasts, thighs, buttocks or genitalia;
    (c) erotic behaviour intended to cause sexual excitement; or
    (d) any indecent act or behaviour tending to corrupt morals

Importantly, “pornography” does not include teaching aides or “any act or behaviour between spouses or couples performed in fulfillment of their conjugal rights and responsibilities, where such matters remain strictly private.”
In their classic Pornography and Civil Rights, Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin argue that in the U.S.,

Law has traditionally considered pornography to be a question of private virtue and public morality, not personal injury and collective abuse. The law on pornography has been the law of morals regulation, not the law of public safety, personal security, or civil equality. When pornography is debated, in or out of court, the issue has been whether government should be in the business of making sure only nice things are said and seen about sex, not whether government should remedy the exploitation of the powerless for the profit and enjoyment of the powerful. Whether pornography is detrimental to “the social fabric” has therefore been considered; whether particular individuals or definable groups are hurt by it has not been, not really.

Despite the Ugandan law’s very expansive definition of “pornography”—it extends beyond the too-cynical “you know it when you see it,” while also absolutely relying on the policing eye to “pornographize” (to coin an ugly term)—it depends, ultimately, on a notion of moral regulation, as seen in (d), refusing to consider the notion of “harm” or “violence,” except in the abstract.

MacKinnon and Dworkin frame pornography as anti-woman; the Ugandan legislation against pornography is anti-woman.

Note, for instance, how MacKinnon and Dworkin define pornography:

(1) Pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:

    (i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or
    (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
    (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or
    (iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
    (v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or
    (vi) women’s body parts – including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks – are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or
    (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
    (viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
    (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.

(2) The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in (1) (i-ix) above is pornography for purposes of subsections (1) – (p) of this statute.

Where MacKinnon and Dworkin’s labor to increase women’s possibilities and freedoms, to remove women from an always-pornographizing public gaze, the Ugandan legislation, especially with its focus on “breasts, thighs, and buttocks,” turns every woman’s body into a potential pornographic spectacle. The Ugandan legislation makes public space less safe for women, a space of continual surveillance and management.

(I think it’s worth noting that visual pornography circulated in a very different way in the 1970s and early 1980s, as a kind of shared vernacular in public venues, so MacKinnon and Dworkin are writing into a differently understood space. While my politics incline toward the pro-pornography feminism of Gayle Rubin and Samuel Delany, it’s worth noting that even that strand of thinking is firmly against harm to women.)
Following the Act’s broad definition of “pornography,” what follows is fairly standard—prohibitions against making or distributing pornography, especially child pornography. But a few provisions are worth noting:

15 (1) Where information is brought to the attention of the court that there exists in premises, an object or material containing pornography or an act or event of a pornographic nature, the court shall issue a warrant for the seizure of the object or material and for the arrest of the person promoting the material or object.

(2) An authorized person in possession of a search warrant issued by the court may enter any premises and inspect any object or material including any computer, and seize the object, material or gadget for the purpose of giving effect to this act.

Given the capacious definition of “pornography,” what exactly would acquiring such a warrant require? Note, for instance, that much international culture features breasts, thighs, and buttocks—ranging from travel shows to music videos. Anyone scrolling through my internet history, for instance, would find the multiple instances where I have watched RuPaul’s “Peanut Butter,” which is certainly a buffet of thighs and buttocks. Based on this “evidence,” the state would have the right to comb through the entire content of my hard drive.

Section 17 of the Act is equally troubling.

17. (1) An Internet Service Provider (ISP) who . . . permits to be uploaded or downloaded through its service, any content of a pornographic nature, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine . . . or imprisonment not exceeding five years or both.

If the overly-broad definition of “pornography” attempts to control what might appear in “public,” Sections 15 and 17 attempt to control what might be consumed “in private.” The private—one’s home, one’s computer, however it may be defined—becomes subject not only to the state’s gaze, but to its right to invade at any arbitrary moment (subject to a warrant, the evidence for which seems entirely too idiosyncratic).

A necessary note: in the Act, “pornography” is defined as

any representation through publication, cinematography, indecent show, information technology or by whatever means, of a person engaged in real or stimulated [sic] explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual excitement

This definition appears to be much more limited–and sensible. Still, it is informed by the thinking in the Bill, and one could argue that the broadness of “any representation” includes the earlier, too-broad definition. If the explicit attack against women’s bodies is absent from this definition, it can still be seen as what is to be regulated, as noted in the Ugandan press’s discussion of this Act as the “ban on miniskirts.” One notes that miniskirts are nowhere mentioned in the Act.
No doubt, many other paths can be taken to approach the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014 (AHA 2014). I have chosen this broad management of spatial possibilities to explore how AHA 2014 figures into how legislative processes imagine Uganda broadly. Approaching the AHA 2014 in this way also skirts, I hope, the “gay marriage” and “African homophobia” frames through which it’s been apprehended, frames that disembed AHA 2014 from other intimacy-making and intimacy-regulating legislation.
And, so, a few words on AHA 2014.

Before president Museveni signed the Bill into law, a special panel of scientists was convened to provide “guidance.” Perhaps this happened to counter suggestions that the Bill had been engineered, and was mostly driven, by religious groups. The assembled scientists concluded that homosexuality is neither “a disease” nor “an abnormality,” a noncommittal response that did not support the Bill. In a curious turn, the scientific report was read as supporting the Bill—it’s heartening to note that the scientists responded that their work had been misread and misused.

Much can be written about AHA 2014, and I fear I am becoming interminable. So, a few quick notes.

As with the Anti-Pornography Act, definitions are crucial in AHA 2014.

“sexual act” includes—

    (a) physical sexual activity that does not necessarily culminate in intercourse and may include the touching of another’s breast, vagina, penis or anus;
    (b) stimulation or penetration of a vagina or mouth or anus or any part of the body of any person, however slight by a sexual organ;
    (c) the unlawful use of any object or organ by a person on another person’s sexual organ or anus or mouth;

“sexual organ” means a vagina, penis or any artificial sexual contraption;

“touching” includes touching—

    (a) with any part of the body;
    (b) with anything else;
    (c) through anything;

and in particular includes touching amounting to penetration of any sexual organ, anus or mouth.

To use an absurd example: my touching a friend’s sex toy—be it a cock ring or a dildo—might, in a very strict reading of this definition, be considered a “sex act.” One notes the proliferation of “any” and the strategic use of “anything,” which has the overall effect of giving the state and its agents control over the meanings of “sexual act,” “sexual organ,” and “touching.”

This absolute—if absurd—control over meaning is central to how the state imagines homosexuality.

2. The offence of homosexuality.
(1) A person commits the offence of homosexuality if—

    (a) he penetrates the anus or mouth of another person of the same sex with his penis or any other sexual contraption;
    (b) he or she uses any object or sexual contraption to penetrate or stimulate sexual organ of a person of the same sex;
    (c) he or she touches another person with the intention of committing the act of homosexuality.

I get stuck on 2.c, on the state granting itself (and its agents) the ability to interpret sexual intent. (I will not cite the obligatory Foucault passage, but will place his name here to mark the trail of my thinking.)

To return to a slightly earlier moment, this will to interpret intent extends the patriarchal collusion between colonial administrators and ethno-national leaders as they sought to control women’s bodies and movements: when, for instance, they claimed that wearing “western-style clothing” indicated that women were sex workers or that men who wore western-style clothing were attempting to conceal venereal disease. To this historical context, I would add the pressures of our surveillance now, when “development” and “progress” proceed by accumulating bio-data, by using technologies that try to detect “suspicious people,” when the securitized gaze is omnipresent.

What are the possibilities for Ugandan intimacy now?
The histories I know best, and the art from those histories, teaches me that, sometimes, the embattled survive, and even thrive. We here:now celebrate those moments of survival, even as we mourn the many gone who linger as an ethical demand, who ask us to make livability possible.

Speaking in South Africa, Sandra Ntebi described fragmenting coalitions, panic-stricken queers seeking exile, refuge, possibility. I heard anger and exhaustion, a desire to fight and to have a life. Strategies to create safety and to build coalitions. The need for exit plans and the courage to stay.

I return to those few, fragile photos of my father as a student in Makerere. I wonder, now, about the dreams that kept him there, about the scars that made Makerere unspeakable, about the shapes of fantasies spun from his silences that populate my imagination. From those fantasies, I attempt to distill the usable so I can imagine the possible.

toward an ethical imagination

Something is missing.

Its absence presses, nags, irritates, makes itself felt. A here arrives to averted voices, elsewhere glances, necessary busyness—the daily labor of being and surviving.

Still, something is missing.

To be a writer in this space, and from this space, means encountering and tangling with that impossible demand: that one be “committed,” that one “generate intervention,” that one change the world one has inherited. Given this impossible demand, one’s frames can seem narrow, one’s aesthetic choice limited, one’s aesthetic strategies constricting, one’s ethical imagination cramped, if not impossible.

(Perhaps I try to excuse my own silences.)

Still, something is missing.
A “we” assembled during one crisis, in 2007-2008, to try to remember, salvage, and, perhaps, imagine a Kenya that had seemed newly possible in 2003. Little of what we wrote and imagined harkened back to 1963. We were, to put it crudely, Fanonian: finding and attempting to fulfill our historical mission. As with all such assemblages, alliances were inchoate, pulled in different directions, marked by different urgencies: those 2008 imaginings were more invested in cessation and survival than futurity.

Still, the urgencies of survival can produce—and have produced—powerful ethical imaginations that continue to feed us, direct us, inspire us.

I am struggling to hold onto a “we” formation that is worth remembering, one that I hope can still do some work, can still imagine a different better

In conversation with Dr. Mshai Mwangola, two versions of Yvonne Owuor’s Dust emerged. For me, the novel ends in dispersal, disintegration, as those never imagined by, and unimaginable within, project Kenya seek other elsewheres where they might be possible.

Mshai saw Justina giving birth to twin children in Nairobi. Justina, now a mother, is an artist; Odidi, their executed father, was an engineer. These are children born to dreamers, makers. For Mshai, this was a moment of hope, a sentence one could cling to, a necessary small gem.

Possibility from unlikely spaces.

Part of Dust’s mission is to insist on the labor of the makers, the creators: Ajany who sculpts, Ali Dida Hada who sings, Odidi who engineers, Justina who paints. Nyipir: the horse-riding man bearing the flag whose image will sear itself into imaginations as the emblem of freedom. Dust insists on the ethical imagination of its makers, imaginations that confront childhood nightmares, state corruption, everyday killability. If Dust is a call to ethical memory, it is also a call to ethical action, a pulling toward an ethical imagination.

This is a difficult imagination, almost unimaginable.

Kenya’s young writers are now working with and on the catastrophe: form dissolves, post-apocalyptic futures are envisioned, poetry emerges as a long, continuous wail. We are in the season of elegies from which it seems no possible futures can be envisioned.

Pleasure has become unthinkable—the erotic Audre Lorde writes about as an ethical demand, a refusal to accept the quotidian as a place of endless depredation, seems unimaginable.

Laughs are stained with bitterness.
If something was salvaged in 2008, what was it that was salvaged? What visions and versions of a possible “we” emerged, still exist, if at all?

The demand, and desire, to “save” Kenya seemed to exist in suspended time: jobs were put on hold, lives set on pause, dreams stored for a different not-yet. And the end of that particular intensification of killability returned us, scarred and bruised, to an interrupted quotidian.

It was a time-bound intensification of killability, but neither the beginning nor the end.

We remain in the season of killability.
I have yet to write the word Somali.

To do so now feels like an “event.” It is a word that occupies all the ellipses of this writing, haunting its opening, its margins, its spaces, and its still-to-be-written. Somali has become an unspeakable word, a haunting word, a question that haunts whatever invocations of Kenyan-ness might circulate and be claimed. We have watched as coalitional ethno-nationalisms turn Eastleigh into a ghetto—and we must use ghetto in the historically accurate way, as a place used to confine undesirable populations, a place of arbitrary and violent invasion by state agents. We have watched as a sports stadium is gazetted into a prison and now functions as a concentration camp: a place of “screening” and torture. We have watched as public modes of transportation refuse entry to Somalis, as police so terrorize families that women would rather leap off balconies than engage them. We have watched as constitutional provision after constitutional provision is violated, gutted, abandoned, as fear mounts and indifference seems a necessary protection.

Is this, I wonder, the Kenya we thought worth saving?

And still I skirt around what I really want to ask.
Where is our ethical imagination?

I pose this question to Kenya’s writers and thinkers and cultural producers, to those who have large and small platforms, mainstream newspaper columns and twitter accounts, ready-made congregations and spectacle-assembling audiences.

How might placing what’s happening to Somalis in Kenya–the arrests, the extortion, the torture, the unmaking, the unhumaning–at the heart of our interventions and critiques shape our ethical frames? What demands might we be able to make–on the state and on each other–if we refuse to accept #kasaraniconcentrationcamp as normal, inevitable, or ordinary? How might we cultivate and nurture imaginations that are capacious, life-enhancing, life-affirming?

The hope with which many of us assembled in 2007 and 2008 to insist that Kenya was worth saving is needed just as much now. Each day #kasaraniconcentrationcamp continues is yet another day that our ethical possibilities diminish.

We continue to lose the soul of what we might have once aspired to be, to cede too much ground to the unhumaning imperatives that will so easily consume us if we let them.

Archive & Method: Toward a Queer African Studies

No. Can’t write it out. Not now.
—Samuel Delany

The problem, as always, is where to start. Which is to say, the problem always emerges where the political now demands an archive, and where the archive, in turn, demands a method. Given our present urgencies, in which we produce archives as their inhabitants and (disappearing) objects, the problem of method can seem both irrelevant and indispensable. At once an act of navel-gazing and world-building. After all, why spend time contemplating how one approaches the life one is trying to save? Isn’t it enough to insist that all life has value, that one’s life is part of that “all life,” to insist, that is, on an “I” that will not or cannot be denied? And, indeed, is this insistence on an “I” presumed and declared not to exist the best method, the place where navel-gazing expands into world-building? In this urgent moment where a threatened self inhabits an impossible world, surely circumstances demand that one use whatever tools are at hand, deferring the problem of method to a less life-threatening future.
How does one encounter oneself as both inhabitant and object of an archive, as the product/er of accident, coincidence, forgetting, recovery, erasure, reconstruction, and illegibility, the “dust” we term archive? And might it be useful to term this “encounter” a half-method, a satisfying trick that only partially assuages desire? A more honest, if less palatable, assessment might be that all methods are partial, Frankenstein assemblages held together by sweat and desire.

But this, I fear, is not what you came to hear.

So let me start again.
We live in an archive-producing moment, from the texts and sexts we generate on our phones to the tweets, blogposts and internet data we create, to the books, articles, and reports we assemble, to the masses of visual and audio material we are encouraged to generate. These are banal facts. To think about all of this labor and (vibrant) matter as an archive is also to note the regimes of surveillance we inhabit, from the employers who record keystrokes, to the various bits of spyware that track our virtual imaginations, to the many state-supported structures that record and catalogue our continual production. As anyone who has assembled or works in an archive knows, archives are as much random ephemera in varying states of use and disuse as they are processes that attempt to organize, to schematize, to impose temporal and other kinds of order.

Within the U.S. traditions I’m trained in, queer studies emerges as a deep reading within the archives—consider Gayle Rubin’s work in anthropology, Michel Foucault’s work in sexology, Hortense Spillers’s work on slave archives. These scholars describe how queer bodies are produced as knowable and unknowable, worth knowing and utterly disposable. And, certainly, the emergence of queer theory in the late 80s and early 90s is marked by many AIDS-related deaths, haunted by the many unnamed who haunt queer studies’ ellipses. Queer studies also emerges as a deep skepticism toward archival methods and practices—arrangement, hierarchy, taxonomy, and erasure.

This skepticism toward method-as-taxonomy similarly marks the emergence of postcolonial studies and African studies (in its decolonizing mode).

I want to mark this skepticism toward method as a shared feature of queer studies, African studies, and postcolonial studies, because those are, broadly, the three uneven umbrellas under which a queer African studies shelters.
I have started by highlighting the problems of archive and method because they lie at the heart of the Queer African Reader, which is, itself, an archive, and a place where method emerges as a question, sometimes as an absence, most often as untheorized. To understand the Queer African Reader as an archive—and, indeed, to understand this entire symposium as an archive—requires pausing to ask what the archive demands as its method. If one listens carefully to an archive, if one allows oneself to be possessed by an archive, then the archive teaches how it should be read. This is slow, tedious work—the labor of listening and listening again, of understanding one’s work as always partial, tentative, experimental.

The evidence of such experiments suffuses this symposium—yesterday, Neo Musangi reminded us that the African-making bible does not contain a First Africans; much of the visual art on display obscures faces and figures—masks and patterns abound in neo-realist figures inscribed by culture; and a particularly striking series of photographs, perhaps the most realist in the entire exhibition, documents absence, as it records the surviving family of a murdered lesbian. This exhibition of the missing, the obscured, the exiled, the impossible, and the emergent ruptures the fantasy of the known and knowable queer lining up to be counted and documented in a thousand NGO reports. Simultaneously, this exhibition hints at the difficulty facing those who would venture into queer African studies.

How does one think with and about those masked and obscured figures and missing and unknowable figures?
Again, this is, perhaps, not what you hoped to hear. So let me conclude by attempting to be more concrete.

I am interested in those figures, bodies, lives, and practices produced at the seams of time, when forms of collectivity shift under new social, political, cultural, and economic changes. When, for instance, ethnic groups assume new configurations under the regime of colonial modernity or when new socio-cultural collectives emerge through religious conversion or through modes of socio-political domination or mixing. At such moments, certain figures, bodies, lives, and practices become, variously, illegible or unabsorbed, unaccounted for by terms such as “family,” “household,” “man,” “woman,” “African,” or “human.”

These emergent and precarious figures, bodies, and lives stretch and rupture our definitions and forms, what we know, how we know, and how we produce and arrange knowledge. Queer, then, is less the fabulous stranger you meet while on vacation, and more the smelly stranger you move away from in a shared bus. Queer is the smelly stranger whose presence disorganizes how we know, how we organize space, and how we occupy space. Queer, in fact, might be the smelly stranger who undoes the fantasy of an infinitely elastic “we.”

I had been asked to discuss the Queer African Reader, because the editors, Sokari Ekine and Hakima Abbas, could not be present. I thought this was an impossible task—certainly, there was no way I could describe the passion and commitment and generosity and wisdom Sokari and Hakima brought to the process. Simultaneously, I did not want to dwell on the various genres in the reader, the assemblage of voices, perspectives, methods, archives. I hoped to suggest the labor of the Reader, as promiscuous method, as necessary archive, as a thing to think with and around. At the back of my mind was a review I’d seen that seemed unable to read the particular work of the Reader—a review that digested the Reader into already-familiar frames available in the North American setting. The Reader’s disruptive method seemed invisible.

The first day of the symposium ruptured my plans–Neo Musangi’s performance and the opening of the Critically Queer exhibition curated by Jabu Pereira suggested the wealth of ways Queer Africa could be imagined, as a particular insistence, as a demand placed on knowledge and imagination and ethics and politics and space. Jabu spoke wonderfully about taking over a university gallery space and populating it with artists in conversation in ways that made it utterly unfamiliar, in ways that pulled differently. The blend of work from Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa, and Kenya, ranging from video installations to realist photography to neo-realist portraits to Glenn Ligon-like experiments with text, moved things around for me, suggested different ways of imagining queer Africa, different archives than those now so regularly cited as “authoritative” and “necessary.”

Work by Milumbe Haimbe, Kelebogile Ntladi, and Tyna Adebowale—about which I hope to write more—drew from and refigured quotidian fabrics, shared spaces, and social media. (I’m tempted to write on how all three work with and around the gaze, with Milumbe’s masked figures, Tyna’s post-realist figures, and Lebo’s techno-township figuration—I leave this here as a promissory note.)

I left the symposium with a richer sense of possibilities, a much-expanded archive, excited that all my arguments had already been anticipated and extended by the capacious imaginations in that space and beyond.

Going South

The South had always frightened me.
—James Baldwin

I first read James Baldwin while on a greyhound bus heading to the U.S. south. It was not my first trip to the south, only the first time I traveled there on my own. Something about the many-hour journey from Pittsburgh to the southmost corner of North Carolina lingers as a sense of horror, even as no single incident stains memory. Baldwin’s prose felt feverish, cloistered, horrifying, and unpleasant. The church cadences so many readers love felt killing, marking, perhaps, my own increasing distance from organized religion.

A loss amplified by every blink-its-gone town along the bus route.
Another journey intrudes, also on a bus, prisoners being picked up, deposited, working on the road.

In memory, cloistered Harlem transformed into a lynching south, a transformation so effective that when I finally re-encountered Go Tell it on the Mountain, it was utterly unfamiliar. And, despite my best efforts as a reader, a teacher, and an examiner, I simply cannot engage the final ecstatic section of the novel.

Perhaps that early journey set a pattern, for I now read Baldwin as I travel. I return over and over to Nobody Knows My Name, essays written from exile and of exile, the writer away from his country and the writer in his country. Here, as perhaps nowhere else, Baldwin wrestles with a sense of deracinating belonging, even as he insists on attachment. This is, I must confess, my favorite Baldwin prose collection.
I am in South Africa—a south once forbidden.

South Africa lives in the history of my legal documents, my legal possibilities, as the forbidden. My very first passport included a large stamp that forbade travel to South Africa. South Africa was impossible—the place where movement and imagination could not go, the land on which one could not step. I do not yet know how to think of this material history of South Africa’s presence in my life—that passport has been replaced; I am not sure where it is, even as the sense of “no” persists—I walk with the uneasy sense that lingers from that forbidding page in a long-expired passport.
Back in Nairobi, writing becomes difficult again, the words I imagined in South Africa dry up, as it rains, as Somalis remain locked up in Kasarani—a sports stadium, now officially termed a prison, functioning as a concentration camp. Catching up with South African news, I see homes are being destroyed, barbed wire used to control access. It happened while I was there—I did not know. The South Africa of my childhood—forbidden, dangerous, destructive.

Still alive.
In the late 90s, I traveled south to meet Baldwin’s ghosts. Now, I travel south to re-encounter differently familiar ghosts—the walking unspoken, the known-unknowing.

At the heart of Baldwin’s “A Fly in the Buttermilk” is a young man, “G.” Baldwin describes him as quiet. G.’s mother describes him as brilliant. Fifteen year old G. has an “unboyish laugh,” understands, if only partially, his role in an unfolding history of desegregation. Baldwin speaks with G.’s mother and, occasionally, G. answers a question, aware that his mother is in the room. The account is saturated with the silence of an unfolding present, a precarious present, a present that might not have a future.

one wonders, now, about
interview characters who
slide in and out of books and essays
an initial here, a brief description,
these fragments around which
so much swirls
and dissipates

Perhaps G. comes to mind because I was in what was described (in one way or another) as a de-segregating institution, an institution with more black students from other African countries than from its own. And while moments of Bennetton diversity flashed here and there, it was clear that it was Bennetton diversity. I could not shake the sense that I had gone south, a place of a familiar unfolding. I felt caught in a too-familiar mapping of the public, noting which intimacies were visible, possible, mentioned.

To read Baldwin is to enter a particular emotional landscape—not rage, for me, but longing. It is to become expectant, even vulnerable. To be open to encountering the world. Well-cultivated armor does not simply disappear, but chinks are allowed to linger, if only briefly.

Nairobi continues to dry up my words. To make chinks impossible. Already, I feel the armor re-arming itself, the suffocating embrace of what might make survival possible. Here, I return to Audre Lorde. To imagining survival.

“Do You Have A Dildo?”

The question marks a performance that has always started before it begins, a question deferred, unacknowledged as worth asking. To hear it spoken aloud is to hear the air sigh, tear, attempt to knit itself together.

Accompanying it: do you have a bible?
In this space, one can buy one and not the other.

“Do you have a dildo?” asked in a university—do you have one now, for use, available. And what would it mean to produce one, to have one on hand, to slide it from receptive hand to receptive hand, to mark hands as dildo-sharing hands.

This becomes a performance
a missing dildo
We assemble on institutional steps, in the shadow of a library, facing a public square where a person writes on a small chalkboard. The chalkboard faces away from us. The wind will blow it all over. The spitting rain will drag tears through the chalk. But this, this we will only know later. For now, we watch writing.

Rocks pour from a
bag. One will be
thrown into the
crowd, the action
familiar: one
winces in
This is called
Hurling rocks.
A carrot is being shaved, a knife held too close to a neck. Red ink pours over a Holy Bible. (We travel in circles and loops to locate a shop where this can be bought, wayward, unable to find the direct line, the straight line, the proper line that leads easily from here to here—the bible
becomes a wayward object

A carrot is being shaved in public, situated between a person’s legs—circumcision becomes castration in this public domestic, becomes the failure of both to produce bodies that can be pleasured: a few of us know this is also an attempt to shape a dildo, and it will not form: frustration attends this deferral of form, this impossibility of/for pleasure—a question forms and lingers

(do YOU have a dildo?)
Red ink pours over a Holy Bible—blood is everywhere indicated, the circumcised body, the menstruating body, the violated body, the bleeding body, the body made and unmade in blood-soaked pages, in smite-imaginations, in imagined

abominations                                                                 the word “GAY”
appears in the scrawl                                         smeared in a Holy
Bible made                                     sacred                     via embedding
(intimate             profanity                 a voice murmurs that fuck might have been written—it is not clear)


A bible is torn, pages crumpled, folded, ripped, undone—a body attacks this bodyattacking book, this book that makes attackpossible, this attackenabling book

pages drift
stick on wet pavement
(my notes smear in the spitting rain)

The board is turned to face a watching audience, an enthralled audience, a waiting audience


Performance remains as fragments: snapping cameras, indifferent laughter, a stranger’s passing comment: one must suspend much to “be” in the performance—to track its desire, recognize its hungers
A knife slices a carrot

Disposability and to Un-Human

Popular history does not record whether Sojourner Truth ever received an answer to her question, “Ain’t I a Woman?” In taking this question as rhetorical, the answer as self-evident, we assume that being human is self-evident, an assumption that is historically and conceptually inaccurate. We risk forgetting (or agree to forget) that much of what we term “human history” consists of un-humaning, of thing-making: not simply hierarchizing types of humans, but actively distinguishing between humans and non-humans, whether that be in the register of humans and things or humans and animals or humans and commodities or humans and unhumans. History teaches that these are more than conceptual distinctions: they are world-making, world-framing, knowledge-producing, knowledge-destroying distinctions, as rooted in law, commerce, and philosophy as they are in quotidian habits, beliefs, and practices.

What would it mean to demand an answer to Sojourner Truth’s question?
As the “terror operation” against Somalis continues and intensifies, several variations on Sojourner’s question have been asked. Many have protested images of soldiers touching Somali women inappropriately, demanding that these women be respected on gendered, religious, and cultural terms. Images of young children with military personnel looming over them have circulated, along with questions about how such operations affect such children. Stories are now emerging of women who have given birth while in police custody—in unsafe, unsanitary conditions. One story claims that an umbilical cord had to be severed using fingernails. Stories are now emerging of Somalis who are dying because of this “security operation.”

Each story and each image poses the question, “are Somalis not human?” A question whose answer is supposed to be so self-evident (“of course, they are”) that those asking (I include myself here) do not pause to wait for an answer or insist on an answer. The answer to this question is rendered unthinkable, unimaginable, even irrelevant, as, instead, state-legitimating distinctions proliferate that differentiate between “good Somalis” and “bad Somalis.” And, here, I would argue that this distinction does not address the problem of the human. (One is then left with the frightening prospect of asking about the unhuman “good Somali” and the unhuman “bad Somali.”)

What is going on is not simply acknowledging that Somalis are unhuman; it is also actively unhumaning Somalis, a fact acknowledged in one person’s question, “why are you treating us like livestock?” In this scenario, the unhuman has no recourse to human rights or to constitutionally-guaranteed rights. One notes, for instance, that almost no official discussions in parliament or in the newspapers have argued on the basis of, or even for, constitutionally-guaranteed rights.

To argue for the human has become difficult, if not impossible.
Popular activist culture in Kenya has made it difficult to think about the stakes of (and for) the human. The too-popular term “M-Pigs,” the coinage of #diapermentality, and various demonstrations have proceeded under the assumption that politicians should be shamed, their behavior described as “animal-like” or “child-like.” Absent from this activism has been any consideration about the ethics of un-humaning. In imagining legislators as less than human, as un-human, even, we have failed to ask what is lost when the position of “human” is absented from politics. That is, what happens when protests against de-humanization are staged as acts of un-humaning?

In part, it is this de-humanizing:un-humaning exchange (choreography?) I’ve been trying to think about through the term “disposability.” Disposability is expansive and greedy, ready and willing (cliché must be used) to accumulate more and more figures, objects, forms of life, humans, and unhumans into its logics and practices. In the process, it banishes (or makes impossible) any frames or practices through which the human (or the good, more broadly) can become visible, legible, or valuable.

Disposability can never be a holding out; it can only be a gathering in.

Under the logic and practice of disposability, the response to un-humaning is to multiply its effects. Thus, one response to the ongoing un-humaning of the Eastleigh operation has been to ask that it extend to all other places occupied by Somalis. Another response, a related one, has been to say that other areas have undergone similar state-led operations and thus to speak against this particular one is “hypocritical” or “much ado.” The logic of “if it happened at x, it should or can happen at y” extends the logics and practices of un-humaning, the logics and practices of disposability.

Locked into the dehumanizing:un-humaning dance, it becomes difficult to hear, let alone answer, the question of the human. And all those rights that hinge on the status of the human become irrelevant: they can never be posed.

I write this because I think the question of the human needs to be posed repeatedly, insistently. The question cannot (should not?) be taken as rhetorical, the status of human cannot (should not) be taken as self-evident, especially as practices and logics of un-humaning proceed and intensify. I write this aware that this kind of speculation—and the demands it makes—might appear out of place, indifferent to real suffering, as it poses what seem to be academic questions. I write this also aware that this kind of writing can seem cold at a time when so many of us are overcome with grief and rage and despair. And, I write this aware that to ask those being un-humaned to human those enacting the un-humaning might be to ask too much.

But to cede the human to disposability’s logics and practices risks ceding all claims based on the status of human, be they enshrined in national or international law, taught as forms of ethics or morality, or practiced as kinds of common sense.